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What This Talk Is Not 
•  A tool 
•  Yet 
•  A library 
•  A framework 
•  An all-in-one security solution 
But it is… 
•  A methodology for implementing protocols 
•  A methodology for attacking protocols 
•  A new paradigm for thinking about protocol 
design 
•  …with some very old roots 
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…applied to data 
Parses Encodes 
Data 
Machine 1 Machine 2 
Data 
Keep this in mind. 
Background 
  2005: Dejector 
  SQL injection = mismatch between expected and 
input parse trees (regex/whitelist fail) 
  Compare parse tree of input string with parse tree 
of expected “exemplar” string 
  Differing nodes in input parse tree indicate clauses 
injected by attacker 
?  Malicious OR clause (“OR 1=1”) 
?  Malicious commands (“; DROP DATABASE; 
--”) 
SELECT from_clause * 
FROM ‘users’ where_clause 
WHERE 
from_clause * 
FROM ‘users’ where_clause 
WHERE 






‘password’ ‘=‘ ‘foobar’ ‘1’ ‘=‘ ‘1’ 
Lessons from Dejector 
  Trying to validate strings in a context-free 
language using regular expressions doesn't work 
  More generally: you must validate with a 
computational mechanism at least as strong as the 
language being validated (minimum validation 
strength) 
  Syntactic differences produce semantic 
differences 
  Parsers are the gateway to code execution 
From context-free to context-
sensitive 
  2006 CRYPTO rump session: Bleichenbacher 
PKCS#1 padding attack 
  Signatures padded to the width of the modulus 
  Number of padding bytes varies as a function of hash algorithm 
and modulus 
  Decrease the number of padding bytes, add unchecked garbage 
after hash, forge signature for e=3 (or 5?) [216+1 is plenty safe] 
•  PKCS#1 is context-sensitive, so parse tree 
comparison alone doesn't work 
•  But an attribute grammar comparison does 
The Classic Communications Model 
•  What’s said: A signature that is strictly 
ungrammatical 
•  Signature is too long, contains nonsense that shouldn’t 
parse 
•  Padding bytes are too short 
•  What’s heard: A string with the correct overall 
length, possibly including some number of 
padding bits 
•  What’s understood: A valid signature 
Semantic Distinctions 
•  What we learned from Bleichenbacher: 
•  If you rely on an implementation that can interpret an 
invalid string as valid, you lose. 
•  We can validate context-sensitive languages 
•  Scripting languages, message formats, file 
formats, network protocols – all formal languages. 
•  ...more or less. (ASN.1, ECMAscript = less.) 
•  Each implementation is its own dialect. 
•  “Mutually intelligible,” in linguistics terms. 
Deconstructing the Attack Surface 
•  What the sender means and what the recipient interprets 
are not necessarily the same thing 
•  Parsing variations lead to ambiguous meaning 
•  Implementation A intends for a string to represent BIGINT, but 
implementation B parses it as int32  
•  Implementation A deletes null bytes, but implementation B 
parses them as terminators 
•  Users don't notice what they don't do themselves 
•  Implementation-to-implementation communication is more 
important than user-to-implementation communication! 
Methodology 
•  Consider the formal grammar (as far as possible) 
•  Examine implementation details 
•  How do bytes become data? 
•  How does data become bytes? 
•  How are unexpected symbols handled? 
•  Does this code really implement the grammar as 
declared in the spec? 
•  Compare implementations at points of variance 
Case Study: X.509 
  Parse-tree differentials revealed multiple attack 
vectors: 
  Overflows (buffer and integer!) 
  Spurious NULL 
  Extra padding 
  Injection 
  Parsing differences in both browsers, web servers, 
and CA software. 
Subject Name Confusion 
•  X.509 Name = ASN.1 Sequence of Sets of 
Sequences of OID/String pairs 
•  Common Name only relevant one for browsers 
•  Name of site being secured is compared against 
CN 
•  If CA doesn't validate CN correctly, it will issue 
certs for names the user doesn't own 
Multiple Common Names 
•  If a CN contains more than one Sequence of 
OID/String pairs, which one do we assume is 
the CN? 
•  Spec doesn't say, formally. 
•  OpenSSL: “Here, have a list of all of them” 
•  CryptoAPI: “Here, have a list of all Strings 
matching OID 2.4.5.3” 
•  NSS: “Here, have the last element of the 
sequence.” 
Inefficient BER Encodings 
•  BER is complicated and lax, leading to multiple 
possible encodings for OIDs 
•  Leading-zero padding: 
•  OpenSSL catches 2.5.4.03 internally but 
presents 2.5.4.3 textually 
•  CryptoAPI: 2.5.4.[0]*3 == CN! 
•  Integer overflow: 
•  CryptoAPI: 2.5.4.(264+3) == CN! 
•  Integer underflow? 
Early NULL Termination 
•  ASN.1 strings are Pascal-style, not C-style 
•  CN=www.bank.com[NULL].badguy.com: 
•  OpenSSL: www.bank.com\x00.badguy.com 
•  Crypt::OpenSSL::X509: 
www.bank.com.badguy.com 
•  OpenSSL X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID: 
www.bank.com 
•  Firefox/IE: www.bank.com 
•  Moxie Marlinspike discovered this specific 
attack as well, through intuition. 
OpenSSL compat mode injection 
•  OpenSSL can emit CNs as text from command-
line 
•  Other scripts use this data, but it's ASCII 
•  Throw an escape character into a non-validated 
Name, e.g. organizationName: 
•  ON=Badguy Inc/CN=www.badguy.com 
•  Oh, look, the first CN we regex out is 
www.badguy.com, must be ok 
•  If you use command-line OpenSSL, use the 
nameopt flag. 
PKCS#10-tunneled SQL injection 
•  In ASN.1 there are many types of String 
•  BMPString: UTF-16, sort of 
•  UTF8String 
•  UniversalString 
•  Embed these in a PKCS#10 request, and you 
can embed any Unicode SQL injection attack 
you want 
PKCS#10-tunneled ASN.1 attacks 
•  In 2002, PROTOS finds many, many ASN.1 
vulnerabilities by way of SNMP 
•  ... especially in BER 
•  Commercial CAs: was your ASN.1 BER parser 
covered? 
•  We did not “test CAs' parsers for them,” that 
isn't nice. 
•  BER is so permissive, PROTOS might not have 
gotten everything 
•  DER is much less complicated, and safer 
Lessons Learned 
•  Language Theoretic Security is not just a 
defensive tool. 
•  Differential parse tree attacks are quite powerful 
•  The more ambiguity in a spec, the more attack 
vectors will be available 
•  Yeah, that means you, ECMAScript and IPv6 
•  Cryptography is rarely the weakest link (again) 
Security at the Language Level 
•  Postel's Law is outdated 
•  Conservativeness in what you send is good 
•  Liberalness in what you accept exposes you to attack 
•  Attacker only needs to figure out what he can make 
you think he said 
•  “Mutually intelligible” dialects invariably lead to 
exploits 
Context-free equivalence problem: 
a spanner in the works 
•  Determining whether two context-free (or 
stronger) grammars generate the same language is 
UNDECIDABLE 
•  Except in the case where the rules and symbols of 
grammar G are a subset of those in grammar H 
•  We proved that way back in 2005 (Dejector) 
•  Implementations that don't generate parsers from 
the specified grammar cannot be guaranteed to 
implement the grammar's language! 
Grand plans 
•  Language validation shims at strategic locations 
•  Network stack, kernel, hypervisor 
•  Protocols to be implemented with a reference 
grammar 
•  Canonical reference grammar specs, machine and 
human readable, used by the parser to validate 
different protocols dynamically 
•  Protocols can be wire, file format, code execution 
format, etc. 
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